- 1 Basic F.A.Q.
- 1.1 What is encryption?
- 1.2 Is there a big difference between storage and communication encryption?
- 1.3 Should I use encryption?
- 1.4 What is plausible deniability?
- 1.5 Do I need plausible deniability?
- 1.6 Of course the police can break encryption, right?!
- 1.7 What about the NSA?
- 1.8 But anything can be hacked, right? Why not encryption?
- 1.9 Using encryption programs myself is difficult, but Hushmail, Safe-Mail or (Insert name here) will manage it for me!
- 1.10 What exactly is anonymity?
- 1.11 Why do I need anonymity?
- 1.12 I already use encryption so there is no need for me to be anonymous!
- 1.13 Tor exit nodes can spy on my communication streams so I should not use it!
- 1.14 If I use Tor can I be traced by the feds?
- 1.15 If I use Tor can I be traced by the NSA?
- 1.16 If I use hacked cable modems am I untraceable?
- 1.17 If I use hacked or open WiFi am I untraceable?
- 1.18 If I send a package domestic to the USA with USPS do they need a warrant to open the package?
- 1.19 Should I use masking scents, such as perfumes etc?
- 2 Applied Security Guide
- 2.1 Step Zero: Encrypt your hosts HDD
- 2.2 Step One: Configure the base system, harden OS
- 2.3 Step Two: Configure Tor and GPG, harden Firefox
- 2.4 Step Three: Use Common Sense
- 2.5 Step Three Point Five: Conceal your membership (VERY IMPORTANT FOR VENDORS)
- 2.6 Step Four: Know how to do safe product transfer, handle finances safe
- 3 See Also
What is encryption?
Encryption is a method of encoding information in such a way that it is computationally difficult for eavesdroppers to decode, but computationally easy for the intended recipient to decode. In practical terms, encryption makes it almost impossible for you to be successfully wiretapped. Encryption can also make it essentially impossible for computer forensic teams to gather any data from your hard disk drive. Encryption is the process of making information difficult or impossible to recover with out a key. The key is either a passphrase or a huge random number protected by a passphrase. Encryption algorithms fall into two primary categories: communications and storage. If you use a program such as GPG to encrypt your E-mail messages, you are using encryption for communications. If you use a program such as Truecrypt to encrypt your hard disk drive, you are using encryption for storage.
Is there a big difference between storage and communication encryption?
Yes. Data storage encryption often uses only symmetric algorithms. Communication encryption typically uses a combination of asymmetric and symmetric algorithms. Asymmetric algorithms are generally far easier to break than symmetric algorithms. In practice this is not significant as the computing power required to break either strong asymmetric or strong symmetric algorithms is not likely in the grasp of any agency.
Should I use encryption?
Yes! If you participate in the Internet underground it is essential for your continued freedom that you learn how to use encryption programs. All communications should be encrypted as well as all stored data. For real time communication encryption we suggest either Pidgin or Adium instant messages with the OTR plug-in. For non-real time communication encryption we suggest GPG. Truecrypt does a great job of encrypting stored data and can also encrypt the OS partition if you use Windows. Various flavors of Linux and Unix also allow for the OS partition to be encrypted although the particular program used will vary. If an alternative installation CD is used Ubuntu allows for OS partition encryption during the installation process.
What is plausible deniability?
When discussing stored data encryption plausible deniability means that an encrypted container can decrypt into two different sets of data depending on the key used. Plausible deniability allows for you to pretend to cooperate with authorities with out them being able to tell you are not cooperating. For example, perhaps they demand you give up your password so they can decrypt some of your communications or stored data. If you used a system with plausible deniability you would be able to give them a password that would indeed decrypt the encrypted data. However, the decrypted data they can now see will be non-sensitive data you intentionally allowed for them to decrypt. They can not see your sensitive information and they can not prove that you didn't cooperate.
Do I need plausible deniability?
Possibly. It really depends on where you live. In the U.K. it is a crime to refuse to give law enforcement your encryption keys on demand. Refusal to reveal encryption keys is punishable by several years in prison, but this is quite possibly a lot less time than you would get if you did reveal your encryption keys. In the U.S.A. the issue has not yet gone to the supreme court and lower judges have ruled in both directions. In general it is a good idea to use plausible deniable encryption when possible. Truecrypt supports plausible deniability for all functions under Windows. For Linux there is no current software supporting out-of-the-box plausible deniability of the OS partition. With Linux you may be able to achieve a type of plausible deniability by encrypting your entire drive and putting the bootloader on another device. Then you can argue the drive was freshly wiped with a PRNG and there is no key to decrypt.
Of course the police can break encryption, right?!
If you are using a strong encryption program (such as GPG, OTR, Truecrypt, etc) and a long and random password (or automatically generated session key, such as OTR) the police are not going to be able to directly break the encryption. This is not to say they can not get your key in other ways! For example they could install a keylogger onto your keyboard or use various transient signal attacks to capture your key while you type it. An emerging method of encryption key compromise uses application layer exploits to remotely grab keys from RAM. These 'side channel' attacks need to have active measures taken against them (the best of which are using a strong anonymity solution and hardened OS).
What about the NSA?
The NSA is not going to be able to break strong data storage encryption algorithms (symmetric). They are also probably not able to break strong communication encryption algorithms (asymmetric). Very powerful quantum computers can be used to greatly reduce the bit strength of an encryption algorithm. Symmetric algorithms have their bit strength cut in half. Asymmetric algorithms are easily broken by such powerful computers. If you are using AES-256 a powerful quantum computer will reduce its bit strength to the still unbreakable 128. If you are using even a 4,096 bit RSA key with GPG, a powerful quantum computer can break the encryption. However, keep two things in mind; It is not likely that the NSA or anyone else has such a computer, and anyone sane will assure you that unless you are a foreign military or major terrorist the NSA will not act on any intelligence they gather by by breaking your communication encryption.
But anything can be hacked, right? Why not encryption?
Encryption algorithms are not hacked, they are cryptanalyzed. Not every single thing done with a computer can really be considered hacking. Hackers may be able to exploit the implemented code of a program using an encryption algorithm, but even the best hackers tend to know little about encryption. Hacking and cryptography are not the same field and most hackers who think they know a lot about encryption actually know very little about it. Encryption is a field of pure mathematics and good encryption algorithms are based firmly on the laws of mathematics as they are currently understood. Unless there is some very unlikely discovery in the field of mathematics the security claims made about most encryption algorithms will stand firm even if the best hackers (or even more impressively cryptographers) in the world try and attack them.
Note: Some hackers are skilled enough to side channel your encryption with application layer exploits unless you take hardening counter measures. This is not hacking the encryption algorithm although it is using hacking to counter encryption. Following our general security guide (later on this page!) will make it much harder for hackers to do this. To hack you through Open Source the attacker will first have to compromise Open Source, we have taken many security measures to make this very difficult to do.
Using encryption programs myself is difficult, but Hushmail, Safe-Mail or (Insert name here) will manage it for me!
Fully web based services can not really offer you strong encryption. They manage your keys for you and for this reason they have access to your keys. It does not matter what the company is named or what they promise, all of them are liars and some are probably honeypots. These services will not offer you strong encryption and law enforcement will be able to gain access to your communications. If you play with fire you need to learn how to protect yourself or you will be burned. It is not overly difficult to manage your own encryption and it is the only possible way for you to maintain your security.
What exactly is anonymity?
Anonymity is the property of being indistinguishable from a given set size (number of others). In the way the term is commonly used anonymity is the inability to be traced. A trace could mean that an attacker follows your communication stream from you to the end destination you are communicating with. A trace could also mean that an attacker follows a trail of logs from the end destination you communicate with back to your location. Anonymity solutions make it difficult to trace your communications and by doing so also make it harder to map out the networks you participate in. Anonymity can also be used to prevent censorship. If a server is hosted as part of an anonymity network and its location can not be determined then an attacker is incapable of demanding the censorship of the services hosted by the server.
Why do I need anonymity?
For protection from ubiquituous government crime.
If you are not using an anonymity solution your presence on the Internet can be trivially traced back to your presence in real life. If you are participating in activities on the Internet which you would not want to be traced to your real life identity, you need anonymity. If you are participating in a network you need anonymity to protect yourself from network analysis. If no one on your network is using anonymity solutions and the police bust one of them, they will be able to see who all they communicated with as well as who all those people communicated with etc. Very quickly and with high precision the police will be able to map out the entire network, going 'outward' to many degrees. This may be useful for evidence (for use in court) and it is certainly useful for intelligence (so they know where to look next).
I already use encryption so there is no need for me to be anonymous!
Although encryption and anonymity highly compliment each other they serve two different goals. Encryption is used to protect your privacy, anonymity is used to hide your location and protect you from network analysis. Strong anonymity requires encryption, and encryption is greatly benefited when combined with anonymity (after all, it is hard to install a keylogger if you don't know where the target is located!). If you use strong encryption but no anonymity solution the feds may not be able to see what you say but they will know who you are and who you are talking with. Depending on the structure and purpose of your network, a single compromised node may very well remove all benefits of using encrypted communications. Many of the most realistic and devastating attacks on encryption systems require the attacker to gain a physical presence; if you are not using an anonymity solution this is trivial for them to do. If the feds do not know where you are, they can't bug your keyboard with a keylogger. Anyone who says you do not need anonymity if you use encryption should be looked at with great suspicion.
Tor exit nodes can spy on my communication streams so I should not use it!
If you use Tor to connect to the open Internet (.com instead of .onion.market) it is true that the exit node can spy on your communications. You can reduce the risk of this by making sure you only connect to SSL websites (https:// instead of http://). You can further reduce the risk of this by always checking the fingerprint of the SSL certificate and making sure it does not change with out an adequate reason being presented by the site administrator. You can eliminate the risk of a spying exit node in some contexts. For example if you encrypt a message yourself with GPG before you send it, the exit node will not be able to break the encryption even if they are spying.
Tor is not meant for privacy (unless you only access .onion.markets) it is meant for anonymity! If you want privacy while using Tor you will need to either only access .onion.markets or you will need to layer it on yourself by using GPG, SSL, OTR or other encryption on top of it. Using Tor to connect to the open Internet with out using any privacy tools yourself can actually reduce your privacy from some attackers. Remember, Tor to the open Internet is for anonymity it is not for privacy. Anonymity is just as important as privacy. Also, networking tools with a larger focus on privacy than anonymity (such as VPNs), will not offer you privacy from law enforcement anymore than Tor will and they also tend to offer substantially worse anonymity!
If I use Tor can I be traced by the feds?
So far, probably not unless you get very unlucky or misconfigure something. The feds are getting better at tracing people faster than Tor is getting better at avoiding a trace. Tor is for low latency (fast) anonymity, and low latency solutions will never have the ability to be as anonymous as high latency (very slow) solutions. As recently as 2008 we have documented proof that FBI working with various other international federal agencies via Interpol could not trace high priority targets using the Tor network. There is a large amount of information indicating that this is still the case. This will not be the case forever and better solutions than Tor are going to be required at some point in the future. This does not mean you should stop using Tor! It is quite possible that no VPN solution offers better anonymity than Tor, and the only low latency network which can be compared to Tor in terms of anonymity is I2P. Freenet is an anonymous datastore which possibly offers better anonymity than Tor or I2P. In the end it is very difficult to say what the best solution is or who it will hold up to, but most people from the academic anonymity circles say Tor, I2P or Freenet are the best three options. JAP is considered worse than the three previously suggested solutions, but better than most VPN services. You should at the very least use an encrypted two hop solution if you want a chance at remaining anonymous from the feds.
Traced is a very particular term. It means that the attacker either can observe your exit traffic and follow it back to your entry point or that the attacker can see your traffic enter a network and follow it to its exit point. Tor does a good job of protecting from this sort of attack, especially if you have not pissed off any signals intelligence agencies. Tor does not protect from membership revealment attacks! It is vital that you understand this attack and take measures to counter it if you are a vendor. To learn more about how to counter this attack keep reading this document, we discuss more in the applied security advice section on this page.
If I use Tor can I be traced by the NSA?
See Also: NSA vs Tor
Probably. If you want a chance of being anonymous from the NSA you should research the Mixmaster and Mixminion remailer networks. NSA usually traces people by hacking them and doing a side channel attack. They have dozens of zero day exploits for every major application. This is also how they compromise GPG and FDE. Your best bet to remain anonymous/secure from the NSA is to use ASLR with a 64 bit processor to protect from hacking + Tor + Random WiFi location.Using airgaps can protect from them stealing encryption keys. This would involve using one machine with access to the internet to receive data, transfer the encrypted data to another machine with a CD which you then destroy, and decrypt on a machine with no access to the internet. Don't reuse transfer devices or else they can act as compromise vectors to communicate between the machine with no internet connection and the machine with internet connection. Mixminion is better than mixmaster.
If I use hacked cable modems am I untraceable?
No, the cable company can trace you and so can the police and feds. However, it will make it more difficult for them to do so. People have been busted using this technique by itself!
If I use hacked or open WiFi am I untraceable?
The short answer is not necessarily but it is better then doing anything suspect at home. Just make it a cardinal rule, don't do it from your house. Government, Google, and other third-parties use geo-location technology to locate in real-time where data packets come from, browser cookies to track where you have been and collect your interface MAC address (which can also be logged on the Access Point and in the case of "free wifi" companies, resold to advertisers). The degree of untraceability you get by using WiFi access points depends largely on how you are using them. If you use your neighbors connection more then once, the trace will go to your neighbor before it goes to you, your mileage may vary. When traitorous hackers such as Adrian Lamo were still legit they were known for using the internet at Kinkos copy shops. However, if law enforcement make it to your neighbors house before you stop the pattern of behavior, they can use WiFi analysis equipment to trace the wireless signal from your neighbors router and back to you (or more likely run kismet and look for any houses that have line of site to that location). Many people have been busted this way. Also, if you use many different WiFi access points but they fit into a modus operandi (such as always from a particular type of location, maybe coffee shop) , you can eventually be identified if law enforcement put enough effort into doing so (you can think of this as an equation cost over time vs. the desirability of apprehending you). Some people have been busted using this technique. If you use a brand new random location (harder than it sounds) every time you make a connection your identity can still be compromised (have any google cookies? facebook? adclick? say goodbye to anonymity) , but the amount of effort required increases (and assuming you are protected from side channel attacks anyway, be they facial recognition software on CCTV cameras or remote WPS infections). We have not heard of anyone being busted if they used a brand new randomly selected WiFi access point for every connection.
If I send a package domestic to the USA with USPS do they need a warrant to open the package?
Yes, if it is sent in such a way that it could contain communications. For example, a letter will require a warrant but perhaps a very large and heavy box will not. For the most part, they need a warrant. No other mailing company requires a warrant to open any sort of packages. International packages can be inspected by customs with no need for a warrant.
Should I use masking scents, such as perfumes etc?
No, masking scents will not prevent a dog from hitting on the package(including gasoline). Masking scents will however make the package seem more suspicious to humans. Vacuum seal the product and be very careful to not leave any residues.
Applied Security Guide
Step Zero: Encrypt your hosts HDD
If you use Windows this can be done with Truecrypt.
On Mac OS X, you can use FileVault, or Truecrypt.
If you use Linux there are various ways you can accomplish this, some more common distributions like Ubuntu, Mint, etc, allow it as a install-time option. But it should be noted, they only encrypt your /home partition. If you want to encrypt a single folder, it'd be a good idea to use something like encfs, and if you're encrypting a full drive, you should look into using LVM on top of LUKS/dm-crypt.
Step One: Configure the base system, harden OS
Application layer attacks exploit programming or design flaws of the programs you use, in general the goal of such attacks is to take over your system. For a deeper look at application layer exploits please check out the this page. These attacks are very dangerous because they can circumvent a lot of the other security you use, like encryption and anonymity solutions. The good news is that Open Source acts as an application layer firewall between you and everyone you communicate with through Open Source. We have taken great care to harden our server from attack and even if you take no precautions yourself it should not be trivial for you to be hacked through our server. However it is still a good idea for you to harden your own system. You don't know for sure if you can trust us and there is no reason to be a sitting duck if our server is indeed compromised.
The first step you should take is running the operating system you use to connect to Open Source in a Virtual Machine. We suggest that you use Virtualbox. Virtual machines like Virtualbox create virtual hardware and allow you to run an operating system on this virtual hardware. It sounds complex but you really don't need to know a lot about the theory, Virtualbox does all the work for you. There are a few reasons why you should use a virtual machine. The primary reason is that if the browser in your virtual machine is hacked the attacker is stuck inside of the virtual machine. The only way they can get to your normal OS is if they find a vulnerability in the virtual machines hypervisor, this adds complexity to their attack. The second reason you should use a virtual machine is because it makes it easier to use Linux if you are used to Windows or Mac OSX. Linux is a lot easier to secure than those operating systems but it is also harder to use. By using a virtual machine you can use your normal OS and Linux at the same time, Linux runs as a guest OS in a window on your normal (host) OS.
It is very simple to set up a virtual machine. Download and install Virtualbox. After launching it you will need to create a new VM. It is pretty simple and the program will walk you through the steps. Make sure to create a large enough virtual drive to install an OS, I suggest around ten gigabytes. You will need an install image so you can put the OS of your choice on the VM. Download the most recent Ubuntu ISO and use this. Remember, it doesn't really matter if you don't know how to use Linux. All you are using this VM for is using Firefox to browse Open Source, security comes before ease of use! Now that your virtual machine has been created you need to point it to your Ubuntu install CD. You can do this by going to the machines storage tab in the Virtualbox manager and pointing the CD drive to your install ISO. You will possibly be required to configure your virtual machine to connect to the internet if the default settings do not work for you, but chances are high that they will. Now you need to boot the virtual machine and install Ubuntu. Installing Ubuntu takes a little over half an hour and is very easy, you can simply select to use the default options for almost all of the steps.
This section is outdated
Bastille is considered outdated, and this guide uses an obviously old version of Ubuntu
Now that Ubuntu has been installed in a virtual machine it is time to start hardening it. The first step is to make sure it is fully patched and up to date. You can do this by going to System -> Administration -> Update manager from the bar on the top of your screen. Make sure you install all new updates because the updates include important security patches. It will take a while to update your system.
Now it is time to do some more advanced hardening steps. These steps may seem to be difficult if you are not very advanced technically, but don't worry it is all just following instructions and you only have to do it once. Go to Applications -> Accessories -> Terminal from the top bar on your screen. This will launch a command line interface. Now type in the following commands hitting enter after each:
sudo aa-enforce /etc/apparmor.d/*
This command enables every AppArmor profile that Ubuntu ships with, including one for Firefox. AppArmor is an application layer firewall and makes it a lot harder for a hacker to compromise an application configured with a profile.
sudo apt-get install bastille
This downloads a generic hardening script that will walk you through some automated steps to make your system more secure.
sudo bastille -c
This launches the bastille hardening script. It will walk you through every step, in general you should select the default option. Make sure you at least read every step, there might be some things you don't want it to do but in general the default options are good.
The new recommended option, Grsecurity
Grsecurity is a patched kernel that accomplishes what bastille used to do. There are guides on the wiki page for Grsecurity on downloading installing it here [ Clearnet link! ]
Step Two: Configure Tor and GPG, harden Firefox
Follow these simply step by step guides in order
Although it is not required for customers to know how to use GPG they still should. Our system will protect your communications in some ways. Your messages are stored in encrypted containers set to dismount if an intrusion is detected. Our server is highly hardened and resistant to hackers infiltrating it and spying on your messages. We are also a Tor hidden service and therefor offer encryption from you to us and from us to the people you communicate with. Our server is still the weak point in this system, a particularly skilled hacker could compromise the server and manage to spy on your communications undetected. The server could be traced by an attacker who could then flash freeze the RAM and dump the encrypted container keys. As far as you know we could even be law enforcement, or law enforcement could compromise us at a later date (the first is not true and the second is not likely, but do you really know this?). Our system does not hide your communications from us if we are your adversary, the same is true for Hushmail and Safe-mail. You can protect your communications with high grade encryption algorithms simply by learning to use GPG and it isn't hard so we highly suggest you do it. Vendors are required to accept GPG encrypted orders!
Step Three: Use Common Sense
You've gotten this far, you've gotten everything secured, everything hardened, but do you have common sense? Maybe.
Don't, by any means, reveal personal info anywhere unless you absolutely have to (even then, be very cautious).
Don't use the same usernames you use on the clearnet, don't use the same passwords, use a throwaway email (or no email) when signing up for things, or don't sign up at all. Be sure to enable No-Script, use SSL always. And like I stated before, and I can't stress this enough DON'T REVEAL PERSONAL INFO! This defeats the purpose of anonymity in it's entirety. If you're buying drugs, get it shipped to an empty warehouse, get it shipped somewhere only you'd know it to be.
Step Three Point Five: Conceal your membership (VERY IMPORTANT FOR VENDORS)
Using Tor by itself is not enough to protect you, particularly if you are a vendor. Membership revealment attacks combined with rough geolocation intelligence can lead to a compromise! The gist of a membership revealment attack is easy to understand. The attacker merely determines everyone who is connecting to a particular network, even if they are incapable of determining where the traffic being sent through the network is destined for. Tor does a good job of preventing an attacker who can see exit traffic from following the stream back to your location. Unfortunately, if you ship product the attacker can determine your rough geolocation merely by determining where you ship product from. If the attacker already knows your rough geolocation and they are capable of doing a membership revealment attack to determine who all in your area is connected to Tor, they can likely narrow down your possible identity to a very small set size, possibly even a set size of one.
This is not likely to be useful for evidence but it will provide strong intelligence. Intelligence is the first step to gathering evidence. The attacker may put everyone in your area who they detect are connecting to the Tor network under meatspace surveillance looking for evidence of drug trafficking activity. For this reason it is highly important that you protect yourself from membership revealment attacks!
Membership revealment attacks are less a worry for customers (provided financiall intelligence is properly countered to avoid an attacker finding rough customer geolocations!) than they are for vendors. There are a few reasons why this is true. First of all a customer is likely to reveal more about their identity when they place an order than the attacker will be able to determine with a geolocation + membership revealment attack. Secondly, the vendors allowed to operate on Open Source have been highly screened to significantly reduce the probability that any of them are federal agents, but the customers on Open Source are not only anonymous but they are also not screened at all. Third of all, the organizational structure reduces the risk for customers; a customer may work with a few vendors but each vendor is likely to be working with hundreds or thousands of customers. Customers sourcing from Open Source are at minimal risk even if they have products delivered directly to there own residence, vendors working on Open Source at particularly vulnerable to membership revealment attacks due to the open nature of the site.
The primary concern for customers is that they load finances anonymously and the vendor decentralizes their financial network. If a vendor is using a star network (centralized) financial topology there is a risk that an attacker could map out the geographic locations where customers loaded funds. After determining where funding was loaded the attackers could do anonymizer membership revealment attacks in an area around the load point and filter out everyone who is not using an anonymizer. This will likely leave the customer and few others. The attacker may even be able to compare CCTV footage of the load to the users of anonymizers in the area and look for a facial recognition match. To counter this it is important for customers to make use of good financial counter intelligence techniques (E-currency layering being one). Customers may also choose to utilize transients by paying them a fee to load currency, this way the customer avoids being on CCTV at any point. If vendors decentralize funding points (ditch the star network topology) customers will be strongly protected from such attacks, however it is impossible for a customer to ensure that a vendor is using a 1:1 customer to account/pseudonym identification ratio.
There are several ways you can protect yourself from a membership revealment attack, if you are a vendor it would be foolish to not take one of these countermeasures. The primary way to protect from a membership revealment attack is to make sure you do not enter traffic through the same network you exit traffic through. As all traffic to Open Source 'exits' through the Tor network, entering your traffic through a VPN first will reduce your vulnerability to membership revealment attacks. The attacker will have to determine who all in your area uses any anonymizing technology and put all of them under meatspace surveillance, there are likely to be far more people in your area using some sort of proxy system than there are people using Tor in particular. This will substantially increase the cost of putting all 'potential targets' under surveillance.
Using a VPN is helpful but it is not the most ideal solution. Your crowd space against a membership revealment attack will increase but perhaps not by much depending on the particular area you work out of. Also, a particularly skilled attacker may be able to determine you are using a VPN to connect to Tor by fingerprinting traffic streams. Tor traffic is padded to 512 byte size packets, normal VPN traffic is not. By filtering for 512 byte streams, an attacker can determine who all is using Tor in a given area. VPN's protect from IP routing based membership revealment attacks but not from traffic fingerprinting membership revealment attacks. However, it is less likely that an attacker will be able to do a traffic fingerprinting membership revealment attack. The Chinese intelligence services apparently are still using IP address based attacks to block access to the Tor network. This is not nearly as effective as traffic fingerprinting based attacks. This could be an indication that traffic fingerprinting membership revealment attacks are more difficult to carry out (likely), however it could also be due to a lack of skill on the part of Chinas intelligence services. It could also be that China is not particularly interested in blocking/detecting all Tor traffic and IP address based attacks meet their requirements.
A better option than using a VPN would be to set up a private VPS and then enter all of your Tor traffic through this. Doing this will make you much more resistant to IP address based membership revealment attacks because now the attacker will not even be able to narrow you down to all people in your area using any anonymity technology. This is still weak to traffic fingerprinting membership revealment attacks!
Perhaps the best option to avoid membership revealment attacks is to use open or cracked WiFi from a different location + Tor every single time you connect. You could even use open Wifi + VPN/VPS + Tor for very high security from membership revealment attacks. Using random (not your neighbors) open/cracked WiFi greatly increaces your resistance to a wide variety of identity revealing attacks. An attacker can still do membership revealment attacks on users of open WiFi but they can no longer gain useful intelligence from the attack. If they detect that an open WiFi connection unrelated to you is using Tor it can not be used to put you under meatspace surveillance unless they manage to identify you (facial recognition from CCTV cameras, etc).
If you are operating as part of a group you can avoid membership revealment attacks via smart organizational policy. The person responsible for communicating with customers should be different from the person shipping orders. Now the customers are incapable of determining where your actual rough geolocation is because product is sent from a different geographic area than you communicate from. Your shipper should be aware that they will potentially come under scrutiny via a geolocation + membership revealment attack, especially if they use Tor to enter traffic.
nother option is to configure Tor to use a bridge. Tor bridges are designed to allow people in nations such as China the ability to connect to the Tor network. China uses IP address based blocking to prevent users from connecting to known Tor nodes. Bridges are Tor entry guards that are not publicly listed and have a limited distribution mechanism. You can get some Tor bridge IP addresses from the Tor website. We do not suggest you use Tor bridges because they replace your entry guard and they are under crowded. This will lead to a lot less multiplexing on your Tor circuit and can hurt your anonymity in other ways, although it will indeed offer some level of protection from membership revealment attacks. China has managed to detect about 80% of Tor bridges, it is likely that NSA knows all of them. Police agencies in the West are probably not yet particularly worried about locating bridge nodes but they can probably do so with near the same accuracy as China. In our opinion it is not smart to rely on a Tor bridge to protect you from membership revealment attacks in most cases.
Step Four: Know how to do safe product transfer, handle finances safe
Note: Although customers sourcing from Open Source are encouraged to take the best security measures they can, it is not likely required for them to utilize advanced operational security regarding mail (such as fake ID boxes, tactical pick utechniques, etc). Because the vendors allowed to be listed here have been highly screened it is likely safe for customers to have product delivered directly to their homes. If you only work with highly trusted and trusted vendors your biggest concern will be a package being intercepted!